Michael Pignataro v. Port Authority of New York and by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-27-2010 
Michael Pignataro v. Port Authority of New York and 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"Michael Pignataro v. Port Authority of New York and" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 1959. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1959 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________
Nos. 08-3605 / 08-3825
________
MICHAEL G. PIGNATARO; THOMPSON R. CHASE
v.
PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, 
a bi-State agency; JOHN DOES 1-5 and Jane Does 1-5
(agents, representatives and/or employees of the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey)
The Port Authority of
 New York and New Jersey,
                                                             Appellant in 08-3605
________
MICHAEL G. PIGNATARO; THOMPSON R. CHASE, 
                                                          Appellants in 08-3825
v.
PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, 
a bi-State agency; JOHN DOES 1-5 and Jane Does 1-5
(agents, representatives and/or employees of 
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey)
2_________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-01767)
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
__________
Argued November 19, 2009
Before:  RENDELL, BARRY, and CHAGARES,
 Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 27, 2010)
                    
Christine C. Lilore, Esq.   [ARGUED] 
386 Main Street
Wyckoff, NJ  07481
     Counsel for Appellees in 08-3605 
             and Appellants in 08-3825
      Michael G. Pignataro and Thompson R. Chase
3Sharon K. McGahee, Esq.    [ARGUED] 
Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
Law Department, Opinions & Appeals Div.
225 Park Avenue South
13th Floor, Room 1324
New York, NY 10003
     Counsel for Appellee in 08-3825 
           and Appellant in 08-3605
      Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
        a bi-State agency
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey (the “Port Authority”) challenges the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Michael Pignataro and
Thompson Chase.  The District Court held that helicopter pilots
are not exempt as “professional” employees under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), and
therefore are entitled to mandatory time-and-a-half overtime
compensation.  It awarded Pignataro and Chase two years of
damages, rather than three, because it concluded that the Port
Authority’s FLSA violation was not willful.   Pignataro and
4Thompson appeal that aspect of the District Court’s order, while
the Port Authority challenges the denial of the exemption and
the Court’s award of prejudgment interest.  For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm the District Court’s decisions in all three
respects.
I.  Background
Pignataro began working for the Port Authority as a
helicopter pilot in 1982 and retired in 2004.  The Port Authority
hired Chase in 1977 and promoted him to helicopter pilot in
1982.   Because the Port Authority classified helicopter pilots as
“professional” employees under the FLSA, both Pignataro and
Chase were deemed exempt from the overtime provisions of the
FLSA.  In April 2004, Pignataro and Chase filed a complaint in
the District Court alleging that they were denied proper overtime
pay under the FLSA for the previous three years. 
On February 9, 2006, the District Court held that
helicopter pilots are not professional employees under the FLSA
and granted summary judgment in favor of Pignataro and Chase
on the issue of liability only.  On March 3, 2006, the Port
Authority appealed this ruling, but we dismissed the appeal on
February 23, 2007 because the District Court’s order was not
final.  On August 11, 2008, the District Court entered a
monetary judgment in favor of Pignataro and Chase, awarding
Pignataro $67,907.23 in unpaid overtime wages plus $19,177.10
in prejudgment interest (totaling $87,084.33) and awarding
      The parties do not dispute that the FLSA applies to the Port1
Authority.
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Chase $50,626.80 in unpaid overtime wages plus $14,297.14 in
prejudgment interest (totaling $64,923.94).  Concluding that the
Port Authority’s violation of the FLSA was not willful, the
District Court’s award was based on two years of damages,
instead of three.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). After
making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s
favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact if a reasonable
jury could find for the nonmoving party.  Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997).  Our review of the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Id.  We
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. Helicopter Pilots’ Classification under the FLSA
 The FLSA  mandates that if an employee works more1
than forty hours per week, he must be compensated for overtime
hours at a rate at least one-and-one-half times the employee’s
regular rate.  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  Employees who work in a
“professional capacity,” however, are exempt from this rule.
      The District Court notes that the Department of Labor2
revised the FLSA’s regulations governing exemptions effective
August 23, 2004.  Because the violations alleged in Pignataro
and Chase’s complaint occurred prior to this revision, the
District Court applied the previous version of the regulations.
We will do the same - all citations are to the 2000 edition of the
C.F.R., unless otherwise noted.   We note, however, that under
the current regulations we would likely reach the same result. 
6
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).   Exemptions from the FLSA are to be2
narrowly construed against the employer, and the employer has
the burden of establishing an exemption.  Guthrie v. Lady Jane
Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1143 (3d Cir. 1983).  Whether
helicopter pilots are exempt professionals is a mixed question of
law and fact; we review the District Court’s findings of fact for
clear error and exercise plenary review over its interpretation
and application of the exemption.  Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc.,
13 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir. 1994).  
The applicable exemption from the FLSA urged here
encompasses employees who are determined to be members of
the “learned” professions, as defined by 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.3 and
541.301.  An employee’s status as a “learned professional” is
determined by his or her duties and salary. 29 C.F.R. § 541.3.
In order to qualify as a “learned professional” an employee’s
primary duties must consist of:
      Under the current version of the regulations, this threshold3
is $455 per week.  29 C.F.R. § 541.300 (2009).  
      This has become known as the “short test,” applicable to4
employees who earn more than $250 per week.  Reich, 13 F.3d
at 698 n.15.
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[w]ork requiring knowledge of an advance [sic]
type in a field of science or learning customarily
acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
intellectual instruction and study, as distinguished
from a general academic education and from an
apprenticeship, and from training in the
performance of routine mental, manual, or
physical processes.  
29 C.F.R. § 541.3(a)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(a).
While there are additional requirements for “learned
professional” status, namely receipt of compensation exceeding
$250  or more per week and duties requiring the exercise of3
discretion,  we concern ourselves initially with whether Port4
Authority helicopter pilots  satisfy the requirements under
§ 541.3(a)(1).  See 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(e).  We thus consider what
advanced knowledge “in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
intellectual instruction” entails, and then examine whether
8Pignataro and Chase’s primary duties required such advanced
knowledge. 
Advanced knowledge is knowledge “which cannot be
attained at the high school level,” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(b), and
which has been obtained through “prolonged study.”  29 C.F.R.
§ 541.300.  The learned professional exemption is available for
professions where, in the “vast majority of cases,” the employee
is required to have “specific academic training.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.301(d).  The exemption does not apply to occupations in
which “the bulk of the employees have acquired their skill by
experience.” Id.  An “advanced academic degree is a standard (if
not universal) prequisite [sic]” and is, in fact, “the best prima
f a c i e  e v i d e n c e  o f  [ p r o f e s s i o n a l  t r a i n i n g ] . ”
29 C.F.R. § 541.301(e)(1).  The requirement that the employee’s
knowledge be from a field of science or learning “serves to
distinguish the professions from the mechanical arts where in
some instances the knowledge is of a fairly advanced type, but
not in a field of science or learning.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(c).
Examples of professions included in the “learned professional”
exemption are the fields of “law, medicine, nursing, accounting,
actuarial computation, engineering, architecture, teaching,
various types of physical, chemical, and biological sciences,
including pharmacy.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(e)(1). 
Although a college or other specific degree may not be
per se required to qualify as a “learned professional,” it is clear
that employees must possess knowledge and skill “which cannot
     “Academic” means “[o]f, relating to, or characteristic of a5
school [or] [p]ertaining to liberal or classical rather than
technical or vocational education.”  Webster’s II New Riverside
Dictionary 69 (1988).
      The Port Authority contends that the District Court erred by6
not considering Pignataro and Chase’s day-to-day duties and by
focusing instead solely on their credentials.   We find no error.
The District Court properly considered whether Pignataro and
Chase’s primary duties required advanced knowledge acquired
by prolonged specialized instruction and study.  (App. 7.)  To
conduct this analysis, the District Court needed to look at the
qualifications and certifications required to perform Pignataro
and Chase’s daily duties as helicopter pilots at the Port
Authority.  The duties that the Port Authority alleges that the
District Court ignored (pre-flight inspection, decisions on
weather conditions, and maintaining daily flight logs, for
9
be attained at the high school level” and which has been
obtained through “prolonged study.”  29 C.F.R. §§ 541.301(b);
541.300.  Furthermore, some type of academic  degree is5
required, as opposed to skill acquired through experience.
29 C.F.R. § 541.301(e)(1). 
We next examine whether the training and study
Pignataro and Chase were required to complete constitute
“advanced knowledge in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
intellectual instruction.”   In order to qualify for their jobs, Port6
example) do not require any further intellectual instruction or
academic study than the District Court considered.  
      A helicopter instrument rating is required for pilots to fly7
without any visual reference to the ground. 
      “Intellectual” means of or relating to “the capacity for8
understanding and knowledge [or] [t]he ability to think
10
Authority helicopter pilots must fulfill the following
requirements:  (1) log 2,000 hours of flying time in helicopters;
(2) earn a commercial helicopter pilot certificate with a
helicopter instrument rating;  (3) earn a Federal Aviation7
Administration (“FAA”) Second Class Medical certificate;
(4) have knowledge of FAA rules and regulations governing
helicopter flights; and (5) earn a high school diploma or GED.
(App. 182, 318.)  In order to earn a commercial certificate,
applicants must already hold a private pilot certificate and pass
both a knowledge and practical test.  14 C.F.R. § 61.123. The
Port Authority sends helicopter pilots to Florida for a one-week
training, twice each year.  
None of the certifications that helicopter pilots are
required to have are academic degrees.  Helicopter pilots are not
required to spend a significant amount of time in a classroom in
order to earn their certifications - nearly all of the instruction
takes place in the air.  Logging in-flight hours, in-flight
instruction, and passing practical and written tests do not qualify
as a “prolonged course of specialized intellectual  instruction8
abstractly or profoundly.”  Webster’s II New Riverside
Dictionary 634-35 (1988).
      The Port Authority maintains that genuine issues of material9
fact exist as to the daily duties of helicopter pilots, such that
submission to a jury was required.  It contends that Pignataro
and Chase’s primary duties, including flying and preparing to
fly, involved a daily exercise of discretion.  Because Pignataro
11
and study.”  While the Port Authority is correct that helicopter
pilots have “specialized knowledge” and “unique skills” (Port
Authority Br. 12-13), this is not sufficient to qualify under the
learned professional exemption because pilots’ knowledge and
skills were acquired through experience and supervised training
as opposed to intellectual, academic instruction.  The District
Court reasoned that pilots’ flight certificates require specialized
instruction beyond a high school education, but do not constitute
advanced academic degrees.  Thus, the District Court
determined that helicopter pilots are “‘merely highly trained
technicians’ . . . and therefore do not qualify as professional
employees under the FLSA.”   (App. 7-8 (citing Martin v. Penn
Line Serv. Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (W.D. Pa. 1976))).  We
agree and conclude that Port Authority helicopter pilots’ work
does not require advanced knowledge that is customarily
acquired from a prolonged course of specialized instruction.  We
therefore do not reach the issues of whether Pignataro and Chase
were salaried employees or consistently exercised discretion in
their work.   Our reading of the regulation in light of the9
and Chase do not dispute the Port Authority’s description of
their duties, there is no genuine issue of material fact.  Because
we conclude that the “work requiring advanced knowledge
acquired by prolonged specialized instruction and study” aspect
is not satisfied, we need not reach the question of how much
discretion is involved in a helicopter pilot’s daily duties.  
      The Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of his own10
regulation is controlling unless “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.”  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 461 (1997) (internal quotation omitted). 
12
requirements for the job leads us to the same conclusion as the
District Court.  Port Authority helicopter pilots are, therefore,
not “learned professionals” and are not exempt from the
provisions of the FLSA.  
The Department of Labor has reached the same
conclusion.  As we agree with the agency, we need not discuss
the degree of deference we would owe to the agency’s view on
the issue.   The Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division10
has noted that the Department has taken the position that pilots
are not exempt professionals because “aviation is not a ‘field of
science or learning,’ and . . . the knowledge required to be a
pilot is not ‘customarily acquired by a prolonged course of
specialized intellectual instruction.’”  Defining and Delimiting
the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122,
22156 (Apr. 23, 2004) (citation omitted). 
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The Department of Labor Review Board (the “Board”)
has also decided that airline pilots are not “learned
professionals” as defined by 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.3 and 541.301
because there is “no doubt” that airline pilots do not meet the
“threshold prerequisite” of “formal specialized academic
training in a field of science or learning.”  In re U.S. Postal
Serv. ANET & WNET Contracts Regarding Review &
Reconsideration of Wage Rates for Airline Captains and First
Officers, ARB Case No. 98-131, 2000 WL 1100166, at *13-14
(Dep’t of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. Aug. 4, 2000).   The Board
found that almost all of the professions delineated in the C.F.R.
as “professional” require college or graduate-level study (one
exception being certain nursing degrees that require completing
a college-like academic program).  Id.  In contrast:
the training of airline pilots in this country
typically does not revolve around specialized
college-type academic instruction, but more-
closely resembles the classic apprenticeship
model--a “structured, systematic program of on-
the-job supervised training” coupled with a
program of related instruction.  
Id. at *16 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 29.4 (1999)). 
The Board further noted that many courts have held that a
specialized college degree is required to meet the “learned
professional” exemption.  Id. at *29 n.11.  For example, the
      The Wage and Hour Division also notes that the District11
Court for the Northern District of Texas held that pilots are
exempt professionals (Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, Inc. v. Chao, 304
F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (adopting the Paul
Court’s reasoning)), while the District Court for the District of
14
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that “airfield
operation specialists” are not learned professionals because they
are only required to have a bachelor’s degree in aviation
management or a related field, or four years of full-time
experience, or an equivalent combination of education and
experience.   Fife v. Harmon, 171 F.3d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir.
1999).  The Fife Court held that “[t]his is advanced knowledge
from a general academic education and from an apprenticeship,
not from a prolonged course of specialized intellectual
instruction.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In addition,
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that probation
officers are not “learned professionals” because their
educational requirement (a four-year college degree) is general
and not specialized.  Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
942 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1991).
The Board and the Wage and Hour Division also noted,
however, that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Paul
v. Petroleum Equipment Tools, Co., 708 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir.
1983), concluded that an airplane pilot was a “learned
professional” and was therefore exempt from the overtime
provisions of the FLSA.   69 Fed. Reg. at 22156; In re U.S.11
Oregon held that helicopter pilots are not exempt (Ragnone v.
Belo Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193-94 (D. Or. 2001)).  69
Fed. Reg. at 22156.
      We question whether the Court of Appeals for the Fifth12
Circuit would reach the same result if the issue were presented
today.  Since deciding Paul, that Court has issued two other
opinions on similar issues.  It held that emergency medical
services employees do not have the necessary academic training
to be “learned professionals” because they are not required to
have a college degree and instead need only “didactic training,
clinical experience, and field internship.”  Vela v. City of
Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 675 (5th Cir. 2001).  The Vela Court
cited a District of Maryland case, Quirk v. Balt. County, 895
F. Supp. 773 (D. Md. 1995), in which the Court found that
paramedics are not learned professionals because they were only
15
Postal Serv., 2000 WL 1100166 at *13-14.  The Board
“respectfully disagree[d] with the Paul majority’s analytical
approach and conclusion.”  In re U.S. Postal Serv., 2000 WL
1100166 at *14.  Despite Paul, the Wage and Hour Division
decided not to modify its position that pilots are not exempt
professionals.  69 Fed. Reg. at 22156.  Not surprisingly, the Port
Authority urges that we should follow Paul.  We note that Paul
was decided approximately two decades prior to the Board’s
decision and the Wage and Hour Division’s interpretation of the
exemption that we cite, and the Paul Court stated that the Wage
and Hour Division’s interpretations are entitled to “great
weight.”  708 F.2d at 173 (citation omitted).12
required to have 600 hours of classroom and field training.  In
contrast, the Fifth Circuit has also held that athletic trainers
satisfy the education component of the learned professionals
exemption because they are required to have “(1) a bachelor’s
degree in any field; (2) 1800 hours of apprenticeship over a
three-year period; (3) completion of 5 3-hour credit college
courses [in specific areas of study]; and (4) a C.P.R. test.”
Owsley v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521, 524-25
(5th Cir. 1999).  The Owsley Court cited Paul in analogizing this
training to that of airline pilots.  Id.
       The Paul majority notes that even though there is no13
evidence in the record that an “airline transport pilot certificate
with single and multiengine class ratings” was required for Paul
to fly, he nonetheless had this certificate.  See 708 F.2d. at 171
(“[H]aving been hired as a pilot with a listed skill level, Paul is
in no position to now suggest that less was ‘required’ by [his
employer] simply because the law required less.”).   Here, we do
not look to see whether Chase and Pignataro have more training
or education than is required for their job - we look only at
whether their employment involves duties requiring knowledge
16
The Paul Court reasoned that, in order to obtain a
commercial license and instrument rating, a pilot must “acquire
extensive knowledge of aerodynamics, airplane regulations,
airplane operations, instrument procedures, aeronautical charts,
and weather forecasting.” 708 F.2d at 172.  Additionally, pilots
are required to receive instruction from a flight instructor, log a
certain number of hours of flight time, and pass written and
practical tests.   Id.  The Paul  Court determined that this is 13
that is “customarily acquired”  by a prolonged course of
specialized intellectual instruction and study.  The specific
training and qualifications of an individual plaintiff are not
relevant to this determination.  Instead, in assessing whether
knowledge is “customarily acquired” through intellectual
instruction, we consider what is required for “the bulk of the
employees” in an asserted profession.  29 C.F.R. § 541.301(d);
see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(d) (2009) (“The phrase
‘customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
intellectual instruction’ restricts the exemption to professions
where specialized academic training is a standard prerequisite
for entrance into the profession. . . . The learned professional
exemption . . . does not apply to occupations in which most
employees have acquired their skill by experience rather than by
advanced specialized intellectual instruction.”).  
Thus, in a field where most employees gain their skills
through intellectual instruction, an individual employee who
gained his skills through experience may still be exempt under
the FLSA.  The Paul Court seems to have focused more on
Paul’s individual situation than the regulations permit.  See 708
F.2d at 174 (“[W]e do not decide that company pilots as a class
perform exempt professional work.  We face here only a pilot
like Paul with the highest flight rating, considerable training,
and job experience.”).  We cannot endorse this approach.  See
also Dybach, 942 F.2d at 1565 (finding that the determinative
factor is the education that the job requires, not the education
that the employee actually has); In re U.S. Postal Serv., 2000
WL 1100166 at *14:
17
[A] close analysis of the specialized academic
training provided to members of a job
classification is a threshold step in determining
whether the occupation generically meets the
professional exemption test. Consequently, we
share the view of the dissenting opinion in Paul
that it is analytically incorrect to “work
backwards” from the level of an employee’s
knowledge and skill in order to infer that the
occupation requires the kind of advanced
academic instruction contemplated by the
regulations.
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“extensive, formal, and specialized training” that is comparable
to that undergone by nurses, accountants, and actuaries.  Id.
at 173.  However, in light of our own analysis set forth above,
that is consistent with the Department of Labor’s interpretation
of the regulations, we decline to follow the reasoning of the
Paul Court.
Based on the above analysis, we will affirm the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment.
III.  Willfulness
Pignataro and Chase challenge the District Court’s
finding that the Port Authority’s violation of the FLSA was not
willful, and that they were thus entitled to only two years of
back pay, not three.  29 U.S.C. § 255(a).  To establish that the
19
Port Authority’s  violation of the FLSA was willful, Pignataro
and Chase must prove that the Port Authority knew it was
violating the FLSA or acted in reckless disregard of whether it
was violating the FLSA.  McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486
U.S. 128, 133, 135 (1988).  Whether a violation of the FLSA is
willful is a question of fact that is reviewed for clear error.  See
Bianchi Trison Corp. v. Chao, 409 F.3d 196, 208 (3d Cir. 2005).
 Pignataro and Chase contend that the Port Authority
willfully violated the FLSA because the Port Authority denied
their repeated requests to be paid time-and-a-half for overtime,
and because others who had similar jobs (e.g., Chief Pilot and
Chief Mechanic) were paid time-and-a-half for overtime.  At
best, this conduct would constitute only a negligent violation of
the FLSA, and, standing alone, it does not rise to the level
necessary to show that the Port Authority knew or recklessly
disregarded a risk that it was violating the FLSA. 
 Furthermore, an employer has not willfully violated the
FLSA if it acts reasonably in determining its legal obligation.
McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 135 n.13.  Here, Julia Basile, manager
of the compensation and retirement division for the Port
Authority, testified that in classifying helicopter pilots as
“professional employee[s]” she relied on discussions with and
“extensive research” by the law department to determine
industry standards for classifying helicopter pilots.  (App.
153-56.)  Moreover, there was legal authority for this conclusion
because the appellate decision most directly on point, Paul, held
20
that airline pilots are exempt as “learned professionals.”  The
District Court concluded that the Port Authority did not act with
a “reckless disregard for the consequences, but rather, the facts
indicate that [the Port Authority] made a good faith effort to
comply with the law . . .  [and the Port Authority’s] actions were
reasonable.”  (Id. at 15.)  The Port Authority thus acted
reasonably in determining that helicopter pilots were exempt
from the FLSA’s overtime provisions.  We will affirm the
District Court’s ruling that the Port Authority’s violation of the
FLSA was not willful and that, under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), the
Port Authority is therefore liable for only two years of damages,
instead of three.  
IV.  Prejudgment Interest
The final issue contested by the Port Authority is the
District Court’s award of prejudgment interest to Pignataro and
Chase.  We review a District Court’s decision to award
prejudgment interest for abuse of discretion.  Thabault v. Chait,
541 F.3d 512, 533 (3d Cir. 2008).  “[I]n the absence of an
explicit congressional directive, the awarding of prejudgment
interest under federal law is committed to the trial court’s
discretion” and should be awarded based on considerations of
fairness.  Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 1987)
(citing Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers of Am., 726 F.2d
972, 981-82 (3d Cir. 1984)).  There is a presumption in favor of
awarding prejudgment interest on a back pay award under the
FLSA.  Id. at 127.  If prejudgment interest is denied, the District
21
Court must explain why the usual equities in favor of such
interest are not applicable.  Id.  Prejudgment interest attempts to
compensate for the delay in receiving the wages as well as offset
the reduction in the value of the delayed payments caused by
inflation.  Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 58 (2d
Cir. 1984) (finding that “it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion
not to include pre-judgment interest in a back-pay award under
the FLSA.”).  Here, the District Court found it “equitable to
award interest on damages from the commencement of this
action through judgment.”  (App. 16.) 
The Port Authority contends that it is inequitable to
penalize it because there was a two-and-a-half-year delay
between when the District Court granted summary judgment on
February 9, 2006, and when the monetary judgment was entered
on August 11, 2008.  The Port Authority contends that interest
should not have accrued during this period.  A significant
portion of this delay, however, was due to the Port Authority’s
premature filing of a Notice of Appeal on March 3, 2006.  We
dismissed this appeal and remanded the case on February 23,
2007 because the District Court’s order of February 9, 2006 was
not a final order.  On July 5, 2007, the District Court denied the
Port Authority’s motion to certify that order for interlocutory
appeal.  The Court ultimately issued a second written opinion
awarding damages to Pignataro and Chase on August 11, 2008.
Therefore, the only period that could reasonably be excluded
due to unfairness to the Port Authority is from July 5, 2007 to
August 11, 2008, but during that time three status conferences
22
were held and letters on the damages issue were submitted by
counsel.  We do not think it unfair for the District Court to have
included this time period in awarding prejudgment interest.
Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
prejudgment interest to Pignataro and Chase for the time period
from February 9, 2006 to August 11, 2008.  
V.  Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the judgment
of the District Court.
 
